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FEDERAL COURT AFFIRMS THE DESTRUCTION OF
LOUISIANA'S COASTAL MARSHLANDS
Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana's coastal marshlands provide a natural protective barrier
to inland residents from hurricane force winds and storm surges. Over the
last several decades, scientific studies suggest that the oil and gas industry
is responsible for at least thirty percent of Louisiana's coastal wetland
loss. 2 After hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which resulted in tremendous
loss of life and property in New Orleans, inland residents brought a class
action in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
against several oil and gas companies. The residents claimed that the
defendants' destruction of Louisiana's coastal marshland exacerbated the
impact of the storms resulting in their damages. 3
The court held that while the case involved controversial political
issues, the case did not represent a nonjusticiable political question.4
However, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' negligence claims because of
the parties' lack of proximity, and the plaintiffs' failure to prove the
elements of negligence under Louisiana law. This note focuses on the
reasoning behind the court's decision, how the court overlooked important
aspects of Louisiana law, and most importantly, how the decision
weakened property rights and environmental protection in post-Katrina
Louisiana.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In the fall of 2005, hurricanes Katrina and Rita hit New Orleans,
causing tremendous loss of life and property. In 2006, nine residents of
'467 F.Supp.2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006).
2 Douglas Brinkley, The Great Deluge: Hurrican Katrina, New Orleans and the
Mississippi Gulf Coast 10 (2007).
Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 678.
4 Id. at 682.
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Jefferson, Orleans, and St. Bernard Parishes brought a class action against
several oil and gas companies. s The residents sought to hold the
companies liable for the destructive impact of the storms. 6 The plaintiffs
alleged the oil and gas companies' activities over the years severely
impaired southern Louisiana's coastal marshlands, which act as a natural
protective barrier to inland residents from hurricane force winds and storm
surges.7
Over the past several decades, oil and gas companies have dredged
canals through Louisiana's coastal marshlands for the purpose of locating
drill sites and installing pipelines for the transportation of petroleum
products.8 Dredging activities can destroy coastal marshland by altering
the hydrology of the surrounding area. Recent studies suggest that the
oil and gas industry is directly responsible for at least 30 percent of
Louisiana's coastal wetland loss.' 0
The plaintiffs brought their claim in the federal district court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana. They based their claim for recovery on
Louisiana strict liability and negligence statutes." The plaintiffs asserted
that as a result of the oil and gas companies' destruction of Louisiana's
coastal marshlands, the "class members suffered injury and/or death,
property damage, and the loss of the wetlands' value as storm
5 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 679.6 id.
7id.
8id.
9 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 679 (The plaintiffs' complaint describes altered
"hydrology" as the process of allowing saltwater to enter the marshlands, which limits
freshwater flows. The freshwater flows are essential for distributing mineral sediments,
inorganic sediments, and organic matter to those areas. "The effect of the increased
exposure to salt water and reduced exposure to freshwater is destruction of indigenous
plant life, which traps sediment, builds organic soils, and stabilizes the soil with a dense
mat of live roots. Without the marsh vegetation, the root mat disappears, resulting in
erosion of the exposed soil and the eventual conversion of the marshlands to open
water.")
1o Penland, S.I. Wayne, L.D. Britsch, L. Jeffress Williams, A.D. Beall, and V.C.
Butterworth. 2000a. Proces classification of coastal land loss between 1932 and 1990 in
the Mississippi Delta Plain, southeastern Louisiana, sponsored by the Agronne National
Library, Gas Research Institute, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Geological
Survey.
" Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 680.
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protection."l 2 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
claims because they represented a nonjusticiable political question, and
because they did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted
under any available theory.' 3  The court concluded that the plaintiffs'
action was justiciable, but the court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss. 14 The court held that the Louisiana statute imposing strict
liability for ultrahazardous activities was inapplicable,' 5 and that the oil
and gas companies had no duty to restore the marshlands to their original
state. 16
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine "prohibits courts from adjudicating
those questions whose resolution is committed by the Constitution to a
branch of government other than the judiciary." 7 Courts typically begin
their political question analysis with the principles established by the
Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.18
In Baker, Justice Brennan outlined six independent tests used to
identify the existence of a political question, specifically, whether there is:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack
of judicially manageable standards for resolving it; or [3]
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due to coordinate branches of government; or [5] an
12 id.
1 id.
14 Id. at 688-89.
" Id. at 689.
16 Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co, 467 F.Supp.2d 676, 693 (E.D. La. 2006).
" Gordon v. Texas, 153 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir.1998).
8 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.19
The tests are probably listed in order of most to least importance, 20 and if
any one of the tests is met, the case in nonjusticiable.21
The first Baker test is the most important because it explicitly has
the intention of preventing judicial interference into the other branches of
government.22 This test has been applied to controversies arising under
Congress's impeachment power and claims that implicate foreign affairs.
The second test, "lack of judicially manageable standards," has only been
applied to cases brought under the Guarantee Clause,23 the Naturalization
Clause,24 and suits challenging United States military policies as they
apply to foreign countries. Also, the Supreme Court has never applied the
"lack of judicially manageable standards" test to a dispute between private
parties25 because cases involving requests for monetary damages are less
likely to raise political questions.26
Furthermore, in Gordon v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit addressed
whether cases involving coastal erosion lacked "judicially manageable
standards."27 In Gordon, beachfront property owners brought several
lawsuits against public and private defendants alleging that the
defendants' conduct contributed to the dramatic erosion problems that the
'
9 Id. at 271.
20 Vieth v. Jubelierer, 514 U.S. 267, 278 (2004).
21 Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
22 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d 676, 681 (citing Saldano v. O'Connell, 322 F.3d 365, 369
(5th Cir. 2003)).
23 U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.").
24 U.S. Const. Art. I, Sect. 8, Cl. 4 (Congress "shall have Power ... To establish a uniform
Rule of Naturalization.").
25 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 684.
26 Gordon v. Texas, 153 F.3d at 195.
27 See Gordon, 153 F.3d at 193.
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plaintiffs experienced on their properties.28 The district court dismissed
the complaint as a nonjusticiable political question, but the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that "there is nothing inherent in erosion claims making
them difficult to manage judicially; the district court need only determine
the existence of liability and, if necessary, the extent of damages."29
The third test set forth in Baker makes claims nonjusticiable if they
would require a court to make an "initial policy determination"
nonjusticiable, because such determinations are best left to the other
branches of government. 30 The United States Supreme Court has stated
that in pollution cases, courts must strike a balance between environmental
protection and economic development, which may be impossible without
an "initial policy determination."31 In Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co., the plaintiffs sued electric utilities to abate the "public
nuisance" of global warming. 32 In essence, the plaintiffs asked the court
to cap carbon dioxide emissions and mandate annual reductions of an
unspecified percentage. 33 The court held that the relief sought by the
plaintiffs would require the court to "determine and balance the
implications of such relief on the United States' energy sufficiency, and
thus its national security without an initial policy determination having
been made by the elected branches." 34
The final three tests set forth in Baker apply when another branch
of government has acted in an area, and where judicial action would
undermine the executive or legislative decision making. 35 Over the last
several decades, the federal government has played a pivotal role in the
management of Louisiana's wetlands. For example, the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 189936 requires that any party seeking to dredge or alter a
28 Id. at 191-92.
29 Id. at 195.
30 Veith, 541 U.S. at 278.
31 Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company, 406 F.Supp.2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 847
(1984).
32 Id. at 267.
3 Id. at 272.
34 Id. at 272-73.
35 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 687.
3 33 U.S.C.§ 403, et seq.
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navigable canal receive a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.3 7
Also, the purpose of the Breaux Act is to "develop a comprehensive
approach to restore and prevent the loss of coastal wetlands in
Louisiana." 38 Therefore, for several decades the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government have acted in the area of coastal
marshland erosion in Louisiana, and the political question doctrine
prohibits courts from undermining their decision-making in this area.
Nevertheless, in Gordon, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that even though the
federal government had granted the permit that allowed the dredging at
issue, they could not conclude that acting to stop the alleged erosion
conflicted with federal policy. 39
B. Louisiana Civil Code Article 667
Louisiana Civil Code Article 667 states that "[a]lthough a
proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he cannot make
any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying
his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him."4 Moreover,
under Article 667, a landowner who harms his neighbor is liable for
damages "without regard to his knowledge or exercise of reasonable care,
if the damage is caused by an ultrahazardous activity." 41 Article 667
limits ultrahazardous activities to pile-driving and blasting with
explosives.42
Louisiana courts describe Article 667 as an "obligation of
vicinage," and the statute applies only in cases of damage done to
neighboring property.43 However, the Louisiana Supreme Court's
definitions of "neighbor" and "proprietor" under Article 667 have evolved
over the years." Specifically, the court has stated that the development of
3 7 Barasich 467 F.Supp.2d at 687 (citing Bayou Des Familles Development Corp. v. U.S.
Corps of Engineers, 541 F.Supp. 1025, 1033 (E.D.La. 1982).
38 16 U.S.C. 3951, et seq.
39 Gordon, 153 F.3d at 194-195.
4 Louisiana Civ. Code Ann. art. 667.
41 Id.
42 id.
43 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 690 (citing Butler v. Baber, 529 So.2d 374, 381 (La. 1988).
" See Butler v. Baber, 529 So.2d 374, 381 (La. 1988).
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Article 667 by the court "indicates a trend in the direction of a broader
interpretation of the language of the article."45
For example, in Butler v. Baber, oyster lessees suffered damage to
oyster beds as a result of the dredging activities by mineral lessees.46 The
lower court denied recovery under Article 667 because the court found it
questionable whether co-lessees of the same property were "proprietors"
or "neighbors" under Article 667.47 The Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the appellate court and explained that the lower
court's limited interpretation of what constitutes neighbors was "not
keeping with the developing concept of property rights." 48 Therefore, the
court expanded the definition of "neighbor" under Article 667 to include
co-lessees of the same or adjacent property.49 In a similar fashion, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has interpreted the term "proprietor" under
Article 667 to mean landowner owner or a person who derives their rights
from the owner such as a lessee. 50
C. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315
The Louisiana Supreme Court has established that a violation of
Article 667 constitutes fault within the meanin of Article 2315,52 which
is the basis for negligence liability in Louisiana. 3 Article 2315 states that
"[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it." 54 In order to determine liability
under Article 2315, Louisiana courts employ a duty-risk analysis, which
involves five elements:
45 Butler, 529 So.2d at 377.
46 Id. at 375.
4 7 Id. at 377.481 d. at 381.
49 id.
50 Inabnet v. Exxon, 642 So.2d 1243, 1251 (La. 1994).
5' Louisiana Civ. Code Ann. art. 667.
52 Louisiana Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315.
5 Butler, 529 So.2d at 380.
54 Louisiana Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315.
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(1) proof that the defendant had a duty to conform his
conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (2) proof
that the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the
appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) proof that the
defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the
plaintiffs injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) proof
that the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause
of the plaintiffs injuries (the scope of liability or scope of
protection element); and (5) proof of actual damages (the
damages element).
The first step of the analysis is deciding whether or not the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff.56 Louisiana courts have held that
duty can be expressed or implied, either statutorily or jurisprudentially.5
In Terrabonne Parish School Bd v. Castex Energy, the Louisiana
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the defendant oil and gas
companies had a duty to restore wetlands to their pre-lease conditions after
they leased the wetlands for oil exploration.5 8  The lessor claimed that
before the oil and gas companies exploration activities started, the
property had consistent vegetation, and the defendants' activities severely
damaged the marshlands.59 Also, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants
had a duty to restore the marshland, as nearly as practicable, to its original
condition even though no such duty was expressly written into the lease.60
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the oil and gas companies owed
no duty to restore the surface of coastal marshlands to pre-lease
conditions. 6 1 The court explained that "the lease's express grant of the
right to dredge canals constituted consent to or approval of the changes
necessarily incident to dredging, thus, the marshland was worn and torn in
ss Long v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. And Dev., 916 So.2d 87, 101 (La. 2005).
56 id.
s7 Porteous v. St. Ann's Caf6 & Deli, 713 So.2d 454 (La. 1998).
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precisely the manner the parties' contemplated." 6 2 Therefore, the court
found that the oil and gas companies did not owe the plaintiffs a duty
under Article 2315.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Political Question Doctrine
In the instant decision, the district court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana rejects the oil and gas companies' argument that the case
represents a nonjusticiable political question.63 The court first addressed
whether the case implicates the second prong of the Baker test because of
the "lack of judicially manageable standards" for courts to apply in coastal
erosion claims.64 The court explained that federal courts have only found
a "lack of judicially manageable standards" in cases brought under the
Guaranty Clause, the Naturalization Clause, suits challenging United
States military policy as they apply to foreign countries, and cases
involving political gerrymandering. s Also, the federal courts have never
held a case to be nonjusticiable due to "lack of judicially manageable
standards" in a dispute between private parties. 66
The court also stated that the Fifth Circuit held that coastal erosion
is not an area in which courts are unable to determine judicially
manageable standards. 67 In Gordon v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit stated that
"[t]here is nothing inherent in erosion claims making them difficult to
manage judicially; the district court need only determine the existence of
liability and, if necessary, the extent of damages." 68 Furthermore, the
court explained that the nature of relief sought by the plaintiffs supported
the conclusion that the case did not fail the second prong of the Baker
test.69 In the instant case, the plaintiffs sought monetary damages against
62 Id.
63 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 688-89.
MId. at 682.
65 Id. at 682-83.
66Id. at 684.
67 id.
68 Gordon, 153 F.3d at 195.
69 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 685.
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the oil and gas companies, and determining such an award typically does
70not require courts to dictate policy to federal agencies. In contrast,
requests for injunctive relief have the potential to force the judiciary to
intrude into the decision-making of the executive branch.
The court also rejected the oil and gas companies' argument that a
decision by the court would require it to make an "initial policy
determination" that is best left to the other branches of government, which
implicates the third prong of the Baker test. 72 Specifically, the oil and gas
companies argued that a decision in favor of the plaintiffs would affect
energy policy, economic development, and environmental protection, and
that the court would have to strike a balance between these competing
policies.73 The court reasoned that the third prong of the Baker test is not
applicable because "an initial policy determination is unnecessary when
there are judicially manageable standards to guide the court's decision." 74
B. Louisiana Civil Code Article 667
Next, the court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the oil and
gas companies were liable under Article 667.75 The court quickly
disposed of the plaintiffs' strict liability claim because under Article 667
strict liability is limited to the ultrahazardous activities of pile driving or
blasting with explosives, and the plaintiffs failed to establish that the oil
and gas companies' activities fell into either of these categories.7 6 The
court also rejected the plaintiffs' claims under Article 667 because the
parties were not "neighbors."7 7  The court explained that Article 667
creates an obligation of vicinage, which "neighbors" satisfy, and thus
Article 667 was inapplicable because some members of the plaintiff class
70 id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 686.
7 Id.
74 Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co, 467 F.Supp.2d 676, 686-687 (ERD. La.
2006).
7 Id. at 690.
7 6 Id. at 689.
" Id. at 690.
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and the location of the oil and gas companies' activities were hundreds of
miles apart.78
C. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315
Further, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the oil and gas
companies were liable under Article 2315, which is the basis of negligence
liability in Louisiana.79 Specifically, the court held that the plaintiffs
failed to establish that the defendants owed them a duty, and that the
defendants' conduct was the cause in fact of their injuries.80 Thus, the
plaintiffs' inability to show causation under Article 2315, precluded them
from recovery under Louisiana's other negligence statutes requiring
causation.8 1
V. COMMENT
A. Political Issues & Political Questions
In the instant decision, the court recognized that the case involved
important political issues. 82 Recently, there has been an ongoing political
debate regarding the balance between domestic energy production,
national security and environmental protection in the United States. There
is also tremendous public pressure in the United States to rely less on
foreign energy, to produce more energy domestically, and to use the
energy we consume more efficiently. However, domestic energy
production would probably come at some cost to the environment, as the
oil and gas companies in the instant case demonstrated by their destruction
of a substantial portion of Louisiana's coastal marshlands. 83
78 id.
79 1d. at 691.
80 Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co , 467 F.Supp.2d 676, 691 (E.D. La. 2006).
81 Id. at 18
82 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 687-88.
8 Penland, S.I. Wayne, L.D. Britsch, L. Jeffress Williams, A.D. Beall, and V.C.
Butterworth. 2000a. Proces classification of coastal land loss between 1932 and 1990 in
the Mississippi Delta Plain, southeastern Louisiana, sponsored by the Agronne National
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In addition, deciding this case in favor of the plaintiffs would
probably have political ramifications because other branches of
government have not yet fully addressed balancing the environmental,
energy, and economic issues that are still present in post-Katrina
Louisiana. Also, as the defendants argued, the current condition of
Louisiana's wetlands is a direct legacy of two centuries of federal
policymaking and action by legislative and executive branches. For
example, the Breaux Act was enacted to develop a comprehensive
approach to restore and prevent the loss of coastal wetlands in
Louisiana. 84  On the other hand, the federal government facilitates the
destruction of Louisiana's coastal marshlands by granting permits for oil
and gas exploration, which is the largest cause of Louisiana's coastal
wetland loss.8 5  Policy makers have yet to balance these competing
policies and make a determination as to what is in the best interest of the
United States' domestic energy policy, the oil and gas industry, and
Louisiana's inland residents. Nevertheless, these political issues did not
amount to rendering the instant case a nonjusticiable political question,
which is consistent with Justice Brennan's reasoning in Baker where he
stated that the presence of political issues will not necessarily make a case
nonjusticiable. 86
B. "Neighboring" Properties
When interpreting Louisiana law, a federal court should apply the
law as the Louisiana Supreme Court would. The court in the instant
case may have reached the right outcome, but it is questionable whether
the Louisiana Supreme Court would have applied the same legal analysis.
Specifically, the court overlooked the Louisiana Supreme Court's
"developing concept of property rights" in its analysis of who can be
"neighbors" under Article 667.88
Library, Gas Research Institute, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Geological
Survey.
4 Barasich 467 F.Supp.2d at 687-88.
85 Id.
86 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
8 Shaw Constuctors v. ICF Kaiser Eng'rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 546 (5th Cir. 2004).
88 See Butler, 529 So.2d at 381.
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Over the years, the Louisiana Supreme Court has expanded its
definitions of "neighbor" and "proprietor" under Article 667.89 The court
has held that the term "proprietor" under Article 667 not only applies to
landowners, but also to persons whose rights derive from the owner, such
as a lessee. 90  Also, the court expanded the definition of the term
"neighbor" when it held that co-lessees of the same or adjacent property
may be "neighbors" under Article 667.91 However, in the instant case, the
court held that the distance between some of the plaintiffs and the
defendants prevented them from being "neighbors" under Article 667.92
Suing as a class should have cured the defect, and the class should not
have been certified if the plaintiffs were not similarly situated in relation
to the oil and gas companies' activities.
Also, assuming that the class was properly certified, the facts of
the instant case are analogous to Louisiana cases where a defendant
landowner damages a protective "wall" dividing neighboring properties
and the neighboring property is harmed. For example, in Joubert v.
Louisiana State Park and Recreation Commission, the state constructed
and maintained a reservoir and dam structure in a state park.93 A farmer
owned land which adjoined the state park, and lost a portion of his crops
when a large volume of water flowed over the dam.94 The court held that
the plaintiffs and defendant were "neighbors" under Article 667.'" The
court's reasoning in Joubert implies that it would have made this
determination regardless of whether the farmer's land extended for miles,
or whether the damage to his property occurred several miles away as long
as the properties were adjacent to each other.
The facts in Joubert are analogous to the facts in the instant case,
where the plaintiff class was adjacent to the oil and gas companies'
activities, which resulted in the destruction of a significant portion of




9 2 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 689-90.
9 Joubert v. Louisiana State Park and Recreation Commission, 345 So.2d 220, 221-22
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Some of the members of the plaintiff class may have been several miles
away but still suffered damages because of the destruction of their
protective "wall." Surprisingly, the court in the instant case held that the
parties were not "neighbors" even though the plaintiff class as a whole
was adjacent to the oil and gas companies' activities. 96
C. The Duty Owed to Inland Residents
In the instant case, the court's analysis of "duty" under Article
2315 was not consistent with Louisiana law. Under Louisiana law, a
defendant's duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard may be
express or implied, either statutorily or jurisprudentially. 97 In its analysis,
the court relied upon the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in
Terrabonne Parish, where the parties were under a contractual
agreement. 9 8 The court explained that since the Louisiana Supreme Court
did not find a duty between contracting parties in Terrabonne Parish, it
would be unlikely for the court to find a duty in the instant case.9 9
However, the fact that the defendants may have contracted with parties
other than the plaintiffs does not mean that they do not owe a duty to
undertake their performance with care and not destroy the inland
residents' protective coastal marshlands.' 00 The court rejected the fact
that other Louisiana cases illustrate situations where contracting parties
were found liable to third parties under Article 2315.101
D. Weakened Environmental Protection & Property Rights
Finally, the court's decision in Barasich weakened environmental
protection and property rights in post-Katrina Louisiana. The environment
is now more at risk because the court affirmed the oil and gas companies'
ability to knowingly destroy Louisiana's coastal marshlands at the expense
of inland residents. Also, the federal government through the Army Corps
96 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 689-90.
9 Porteous v. St. Ann's Care & Deli, 713 So.2d 454 (La. 1998).
98 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 691-92.
9 Id.
" Id. at 693.
101 Id.
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of Engineers, facilitates the destruction of Louisiana's coastal marshlands
by providing permits to the oil and gas companies.102 Thus, the federal
government facilitates the destruction of Louisiana's coastal marshlands
and simultaneously enacts legislation such as the Breaux Act to repair the
damage.103
Property rights are weakened in post-Katrina Louisiana because
the residents of New Orleans will likely avoid living in areas that may be
affected by increased storm surges due to the destroyed marshlands.
Residents that remain in these areas may face higher costs, such as
homeowner's insurance, as a result of the oil and gas companies'
activities. Thus, the oil and gas companies have managed to pass the costs
of their activities onto Louisiana's inland residents. Also, property rights
are weaker because the court's decision demonstrated the difficulty that
plaintiffs have in meeting the legal standards to prove liability even when
the defendants' destructive activities are well documented.104
IV. CONCLUSION
The court in Barasich ignored the Louisiana Supreme Court's
"developing concept of property rights," which was the basis for the
Louisiana Supreme Court's expansion of the definition of what constitutes
"neighbors" under Article 667. The court also affirmed that the oil and
gas industry can knowingly destroy Louisiana's coastal marshlands, and
have no duty to the inland residents of New Orleans who rely on the
marshlands for a portion of their protection from hurricanes like Katrina.
As a result, the court's legal analysis and decision weakened property
rights and environmental protection in post-Katrina Louisiana.
DARRYL CHATMAN
102 Barasich, 467 F.Supp.2d at 687-88.
103 Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co, 467 F.Supp.2d 676, 687-88 (E.D. La.
2006).
'0 See Penland, S.I. Wayne, L.D. Britsch, L. Jeffress Williams, A.D. Beall, and V.C.
Butterworth. 2000a. Process classification of coastal land loss between 1932 and 1990 in
the Mississippi Delta Plain, southeastern Louisiana, sponsored by the Agronne National
Library, Gas Research Institute, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Geological
Survey.
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